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NOTES
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and U.S. Securities
Law: Seeking Limits for Application of the
10(b) and 1 Ob-5 Antifraud Provisions*
BY BRANDY L. FULKERSON**
I. INTRODUCTION
S ecurities markets and their participants function globally; as a
result, their interactions create complex litigation issues through
transactions with both foreign and domestic conduct and effects.' The
United States heavily regulates its securities markets to protect participants
and provide attractive remedies for violations of U.S. securities law. The
United States remains an attractive forum for securities litigation due to the
availability of substantive remedies and procedural devices, such as the
class action, that are unavailable in many foreign states, and deference to
plaintiff autonomy. Other countries, however, also have securities law to
regulate their markets and the conduct within their territorial borders. An
increased likelihood of plaintiff success under U.S. law is not a valid
justification for exercising jurisdiction if another forum would be more
appropriate.2 This presents the question of when United States courts
* This Note was originally written for University of Kentucky Professor Mary
J. Davis's Complex Litigation Seminar. Professor Davis provided insightful
guidance, indispensable to the author in crafting this work.
** J.D. expected 2004, University of Kentucky.
'Michael Mann & William P. Barry, Developments in the Internationalization
of Securities Enforcement in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS 2003:
EMERGING BEST PRACTICES FOR ARAPIDLY EVOLVING REGULATORY SCHEME (PLI
Corp. Law & Practice Course, Handbook at Series No. BO-OTL, 2003); 1372
PLI!Corp. 817 (Westlaw).
2 Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953, 958 (10th Cir.
1992).
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should apply U.S. securities law extraterritorially,3 and when courts should
deny jurisdiction, effectively forcing plaintiffs into another forum and
deferring to foreign law.
The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") regulates foreign
securities transactions in the areas of registration and disclosure in the
Securities Act of 1933 ("'33 Act")4 through Regulation S,5 which provides
courts and market participants with guidance as to when the registration
and disclosure laws apply extraterritorially. Congress and the SEC,
however, failed to provide meaningful direction to courts regarding
extraterritorial application of the antifraud provisions of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 ("'34 Act").6 Extraterritorial application of the
antifraud provisions creates complex jurisdictional questions for courts.
Since Congress did not expressly provide courts with the authority to
exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over foreign violations of '34 Act
antifraud law, courts must formulate their own substantive approaches to
these complex jurisdictional issues.
The resulting approaches that govern the extraterritorial application of
'34 Act antifraud law are based on the location of the alleged violator's
conduct and whom that conduct affects.7 When a U.S. citizen's conduct
occurring in the United States is the basis for jurisdiction, a U.S. court's
finding of jurisdiction comports with historical notions of territorial
jurisdiction, even if the conduct only has foreign effects.8 The exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction becomes problematic when conduct abroad,
causing effects abroad, is brought within the reach of U.S. law by
insubstantial conduct or effects with a tenuous relationship to the case's
subject matter. The approaches that currently govern the extraterritorial
application of the '34 Act antifraud provisions do not effectively limit U.S.
3 In the context of this Note, "extraterritorial" describes conduct or effects
outside the geographical limits of the United States. See William S. Dodge,
Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEY J. INT'L
L. 85, 88 n.25 (1998) (discussing when a regulation may be considered
extraterritorial).
4 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77z-3 (2004).
17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-.905 (2004).
6 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2004).
7 See infra notes 63-70 and accompanying text for descriptions of the conduct
and effects tests.
8 See Millikin v. Meier, 311 U.S. 457,463-64 (1941) (holding that a state has
personal jurisdiction over its citizens no matter where they live, as long as the state
gives proper notice).
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courts' jurisdiction.9 U.S. courts thus infringe on foreign state sovereignty
and unpredictably apply unclear jurisdictional doctrines. To promote
consistent and predictable application of the '34 Act antifraud provisions,
courts should consider the trans-substantive principles of international law,
conflict of laws, and the presumption against extraterritoriality in their
jurisdictional analyses.
This Note first sets out a basic definitional framework for U.S.
securities law'" and jurisdictional principles" that operate throughout this
Note. The Note next discusses the presumption against extraterritoriality,"2
international law, 13 and conflict of laws 4 as proposed trans-substantive
limits on extraterritorial jurisdiction. Finally, it examines recent court
decisions involving extraterritorial application of '34 Act antifraud law to
illustrate the expansion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in the lower federal
courts. These cases highlight the ineffectiveness of current subject matter
jurisdiction tests and show how these tests can be improved by considering
the trans-substantive principles of international law, conflict of laws, and
the presumption against extraterritoriality. 5
II. BASIC FRAMEWORK
A. Securities Laws
Congress initially passed federal securities law in response to the
market crash of 1929 and the ensuing Great Depression. 6 The '33 Act
regulates the public offering and sale of securities by mandating public
disclosures through the registration of securities. The general goal of the
'33 Act is to protect investors by providing access to information, thus
allowing investors to make informed investment decisions. The '34 Act
deals with trading markets and their participants, and was promulgated to
"insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets."' 7 The '33 and '34 Acts
9 See generally Kellye Y. Testy, Comity and Cooperation: Securities
Regulation in a Global Marketplace, 45 ALA. L. REV. 927 (1994).
10 See infra notes 16-33 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 34-73 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 74-89 and accompanying text.
'3 See infra notes 90-108 and accompanying text.
"4 See infra notes 109-21 and accompanying text.
'5 See infra notes 122-90 and accompanying text.
16 JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 3 (3d ed. 2001).
" 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2004).
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include antifraud provisions prohibiting fraud in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security.
8
Both Acts use "interstate commerce" as a jurisdictional boundary; yet
the Acts define interstate commerce so broadly that the boundary is false.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(7), for example, defines interstate commerce, for '33
Act purposes,' 9 to include "trade or commerce in securities or any
transportation or communication relating thereto... between any foreign
country and any State .... It20  would be possible under this definition for
a telephone call originating from a French corporation's New York office
to a French investor in France, concerning the sale of a security registered
on a French exchange, to be brought within the '33 Act's registration
requirements. This result is undesirable in light of the goal of protecting the
integrity of U.S. markets and market investors.2' It is also at odds with
international law, conflict of laws, and Constitutional law principles
discussed later.22 While the '34 Act antifraud provisions may reach this
hypothetical transaction, it is not within reach of the '33 Act's registration
provisions despite the same broad jurisdictional language in both Acts.23
Regulation S explains the contrary results. The SEC promulgated
Regulation S in 1990 to redefine and formalize the SEC's prior informal
position regarding extraterritorial application of the '33 Act's registration
provisions.24 Regulation S categorized certain transactions as "outside the
"s Id. § 78j(b), also known as § 10(b) of the '34 Act, is the prohibitory reg-
ulation, and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004), orRule lOb-5 of the '34 Act, is the rule
promulgated by the SEC to enforce § 10(b). 15 U.S.C. § 77q is the '33 Act's
antifraud provision.
"9 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(17) defines interstate commerce for '34 Act purposes and
varies slightly from the '33 Act's definition.
2 1 Id. § 77b(a)(7).
21 See id. § 78b.
22 See infra notes 90-121 and accompanying text.
23 See Europe and Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribas
London, 147 F.3d 118, 129 (2d Cir. 1998) ("Although phone calls (or any other
communications into the United States) soliciting or conveying an offer to sell
securities ordinarily would be sufficient to support jurisdiction, it would be
inconsistent with the law of this circuit to accept jurisdiction over this dispute,
because the surrounding circumstances show that no relevant interest of the United
States was implicated.")
24 See generally Offshore Offers and Sales, Exchange Act Release No. 6863,
1990 WL 311658, *1 (Apr. 24, 1990) (adopting Regulation S "to clarify the
extraterritorial application of the registration provisions of the Securities Act of
1933").
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United States" '25 and, therefore, not subject to the '33 Act's registration
requirements. The SEC articulated the following reasoning for this
extraterritorial limit on registration requirements:
The registration of securities is intended to protect the U.S. capital
markets and investors purchasing in the U.S. market, whether U.S. or
foreign nationals. Principles of comity and the reasonable expectations of
participants in the global markets justify reliance on laws applicable in
jurisdictions outside the United States to define requirements for
transactions effected offshore. The territorial approach recognizes the
primacy of the laws in which a market is located. As investors choose
their markets, they choose the laws and regulations applicable in such
markets.
26
Though it restricted the extraterritorial application of the registration
provisions, the SEC specifically noted that the exception did not extend to
the '34 Act's antifraud provisions.27 One author suggests there is no basis
for the distinction and argues that the SEC and courts have adopted
"without analysis" the view that "different considerations apply when
considering the registration requirements ... than when considering the
antifraud provisions.... "28 The functions of the provisions may explain the
different treatment.
The registration provisions are generally disclosure requirements meant
to provide information to investors purchasing securities. The requirements
are highly technical and differ from one jurisdiction to another. For
example, the French system of accomplishing disclosure to protect
investors, although equivalent in effect, may be technically different from
the U.S. registration provisions. Therefore, in order to accurately price the
cost of their capital structures, companies must know with certainty when
disclosure provisions apply to them. In other words, French companies will
not by chance comply with U.S. registration provisions. Consequently, the
SEC has created guidelines for when these provisions will apply
extraterritorially, allowing foreign companies to avoid these expensive
requirements if they so choose.29
The antifraud provisions differ in that they protect investors from any
false and misleading statements made in connection with the purchase or
25 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(a) (2004).
26 Exchange Act Release No. 6863, 1990 WL 311658, at *5 (footnotes omitted).
27 Id.
28 Testy, supra note 9, at 956-58.
29 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-.905.
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sale of securities and are intended to eliminate deception and manipulation
in markets. Making false statements to investors is intuitively wrong and
likely violates anyjurisdiction's securities law. There are certainly nuances,
such as scienter requirements, that may vary among jurisdictions, but fraud
is simply "bad" no matter the location. Compliance with the U.S. antifraud
provisions is less technical and less costly than compliance with the U.S.
registration provisions.3" This distinction may have motivated the SEC to
restrict the extraterritorial reach of the registration provisions while not
restricting the antifraud provisions.3' Regardless of the reasoning behind
the SEC's differing treatment of these provisions, the United States
Supreme Court has consistently held that statutes with broad definitions of
"commerce" that include "foreign commerce" do not automatically apply
abroad;32 rather, Congress must provide additional intent that a statute
apply extraterritorially.33 Courts are thus left to decide when to apply the
antifraud provisions of the '34 Act extraterritorially.
B. Jurisdictional Principles
1. Personal Jurisdiction 
34
Personal jurisdiction, founded upon the Constitutional right to due
process,35 limits the extraterritorial application of the securities law to
30 See James P. Jalil, Proposals for Insider Trading Regulation After the Fall
of the House ofEnron, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 689, 697-98 (2003) ("The
registration process is cumbersome, time consuming and expensive.").
3 Alternatively, if fraud is fraud no matter the jurisdiction, then there is little
need for the United States to extend its antifraud provisions to foreign conduct,
since the laws of the jurisdiction in which the conduct occurs should afford
protection to investors. For further discussion of problems created by lack of clarity
in extraterritorial application of the antifraud provisions, and possible reasons for
the varying treatment by the SEC of the disclosure and registration provisions, see
Joel P. Trachtman, Recent Initiatives in International Financial Regulation and
Goals of Competitiveness, Effectiveness, Consistency and Cooperation, 12 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 241, 292-300 (1991).
32 Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S.
244, 251 (1991).
33 Id. at 248.
31 While the focus of this Note is subject matter jurisdiction, it is important to
understand the complexity that personal jurisdiction adds to the problem addressed.
When courts find subject matter jurisdiction over cases tenuously connected to the
United States, courts are motivated to bend the principles of personal jurisdiction
to reach foreign defendants.
" See generally Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 715 (1877) ("The term, 'due
process of law,' when applied to judicial proceedings, means... [the defendant]
must be brought within [the court's] jurisdiction by service of process within the
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particular defendants. Due process requires that a non-resident defendant
purposefully avail himself of the forum state' sjurisdiction36 by establishing
"sufficient minimum contacts"' 37 with the United States so that "he should
reasonably anticipate being haled into" a U.S. court.3" Due process also
requires that the exercise of jurisdiction be reasonable, in that it "does not
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice., 39 Consider
the following standard set forth in SEC v. Softpoint, Inc. :40
[A] court may exercise its personal jurisdiction [over a defendant] in a
securities action so long as the defendant's activities had "an unmistak-
ably foreseeable effect within the United States," and could "reasonably
be expected to be visited upon United States shareholders. 41
This standard (the Sofitpoint/Unifund standard) is used by many federal
courts in securities cases to determine whether there is personal jurisdiction
over a non-resident defendant. This test contains no substantiality
requirement and may therefore confer jurisdiction over defendants whose
conduct has foreseeable, yet inconsequential, effects on U.S.
shareholders.42
State, or by his voluntary appearance.").
31 Jurisdiction over securities cases is based on a federal statute rather than
diversity, and therefore the United States as a whole serves as the applicable forum
for minimum contacts analysis. See SEC v. Gonzalez de Castilla, No. 01 Civ. 3999,
2001 WL 940560, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2001).
37 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). The
following is a list of activities sufficient to establish minimum contacts with the
forum state: long term relationship (systematic and continuous) with forum state,
id. at 320; serving or seeking to serve market of forum state, Asahi Metal Indus.
Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987); delivering products into
stream of commerce with expectation that they will end up in forum state, id.; and
commercial activity affecting residents or wrongful activity directed at and causing
injury in the forum state, Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984).
38 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
" International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. The following are factors to consider
when assessing reasonableness: interest of the United States in providing a forum
to the plaintiff; interest of the plaintiff in obtaining effective and convenient relief;
interest of the state in regulating activity involved; burden of the defendant to
defend in the United States; avoiding multiple or conflicting suits; and public
policy interest. Asahi Metal Indus. Co., 480 U.S. at 113.
40 SEC v. Softpoint, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 2951, 2001 WL 43611, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 18, 2001).
41 Id. at *5 (quoting SEC v. Unifund SAL, 910 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1990)).
42 See id.
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SEC v. Alexander illustrates the expansive nature of the Softpoint/
Unifund standard. 3 In Alexander, the SEC filed suit against Constantine
Spyropoulos and Penelope Afouxendine for insider trading in violation of
10(b) and lOb-5, as well as other rules." Spyropoulos and Afouxendine
were Greek citizens and residents of Greece.45 They owned no property in
the United States, maintained no brokerage accounts in the United States,
and had no business contacts in the United States.46 Their previous trips to
the United States were for medical treatment in 1991 and 1993, and a
vacation in 2001.
The SEC alleged Spyropoulos and Afouxendine received and traded on
material nonpublic information concerning a proposed takeover by
Luxottica 48 of U.S. Shoe, a U.S. company traded on the New York Stock
Exchange. Spyropoulos bought 9000 shares of U.S. Shoe and options for
27,000 additional shares. After the takeover was announced, Spyropoulos
sold those shares for a $117,175 profit, using Afouxendine's brokerage
account in Greece. The district court, after discussing the due process
analysis necessary to establish personal jurisdiction over these non-resident
defendants, applied the Softpoint/Unifund standard and found personal
jurisdiction existed as to Spyropoulos, but not as to Afouxendine.49 The
court found Spyropoulos's activities had an "unmistakably foreseeable
effect within the United States" and those activities "could reasonably be
expected to be visited" upon United States shareholders because of the
volume of shares traded and the amount of profits realized by
Spyropoulos. ° One transaction, a single purchase and sale by a non-
resident with no other ties to the United States, sufficed to establish
purposeful availment and reasonableness under this court's analysis.5
13 SEC v. Alexander, No. 00 Civ. 7290 LTS HBP, 2003 WL 21196852
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
44Id. at *1.
45 Id. Spyropoulos, although also a U.S. citizen, was a non-resident for personal
jurisdiction analysis because he lived in Greece. Id.
46Id.
47 Id.
48 Luxottica was an Italian company with American Depository Receipts
("ADRs") traded on the New York Stock Exchange. Id. Institutions such as banks
issue ADRs in exchange for the securities of a company, thereby creating a U.S.
market for a foreign company's securities without registering the securities under
the '33 Act.
41 Id. at *3.
'Old. at *2 (quoting SEC v. Softpoint, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 2951, 2001 WL 43611,
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18. 2001)).
5 Id. at *1.
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Consider, by contrast, the result under a strict due process analysis.
Purposeful availment is established by sufficient minimum contacts with
the forum state and reasonable anticipation by the defendant that he may be
haled into court in the forum state.52 Spyropoulos did not have a long-term
relationship with the United States, only a few visits unrelated to the
transaction at issue.53 Spyropoulos was not serving or seeking to serve a
U.S. market, delivered no products into the stream of commerce with the
expectation that they would end up in the United States, and, since his
broker was in Greece, initiated no contacts with anyone that would create
a substantial connection with the United States.54 Trading of U.S. Shoe's
shares on the NASDAQ is commercial activity, but the substantiality of this
small trade's effect on U.S. market participants is questionable." These
inquiries into minimum contacts are not exclusive, but are persuasive as to
whether sufficient minimum contacts exist absent another overriding factor.
Arguably, it is not reasonable for Spyropoulos to expect the SEC to hale
him into a U.S. court over one trade resulting in little over $100,000
profit.56 It is questionable whether minimum contacts exist under a strict
due process analysis or under traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.57
Certainly the United States has a significant interest in policing its
securities markets, and in this case the absence of violations abroad may
shift the scales in favor of the United States' interests. It may be impossi-
ble, however, for the U.S. court to subpoena the key defense witness, the
broker who executed the trade. Traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice are not served by the exercise of personal jurisdiction if
foreign securities laws are available to prosecute the activity and the burden
is great on a non-resident defendant to come to the U.S. and defend the
suit.,8
The result in Alexander may have been different under a strict due
process analysis. Consider hypothetically that out of this same conduct,
claims arose against Spyropoulos for fraud and for professional negligence.
Personal jurisdiction may exist over Spyropoulos for the securities claim
under the Sofipoint/Unifund standard, but not for the fraud or negligence
claims under the traditional due process analysis. This is an undesirable
52 See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
53Alexander, 2003 WL 21196852 at *1.
4 See supra note 37.
5 See supra note 37.
56 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
7 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
s See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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result given our legal system's goal of procedural trans-substantivity:
"[D]ifferent procedural rules should not result in different substantive
outcomes for similarly situated parties."5 9 Courts can reduce the risk of
inequity to plaintiffs and the violation of defendants' due process rights by
applying a trans-substantive strict due process analysis to securities cases.
2. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited to classes of cases
permitted by the Constitution and authorized by Congress.6° If Congress has
the Constitutional power to legislate in a field, then Congress may choose
to expressly apply that legislation extraterritorially.6" Such an express
provision clearly grants subject matter jurisdiction to a federal court
applying U.S. law to conduct or effects occurring outside of its territorial
jurisdiction.62 The presence of subject matter jurisdiction becomes more
difficult when the legislation contains no express Congressional intent for
extraterritorial applications. This is the state of the 10(b) and lOb-5
antifraud provisions of the '34 Act. In the absence of Congressional
direction, courts developed two alternative approaches to determine when
they have subject matter jurisdiction over 10(b) and 10b-5 antifraud claims
under the U.S. securities law: the conduct test and the effects test.
The conduct test confers subject matter jurisdiction on a federal court
based on the location of the conduct.63 The amount and type of conduct
necessary to establish jurisdiction varies among the circuits. The Second
Circuit, where a significant amount of securities litigation is initiated, relies
on the following narrow view of conduct: (1) the defendant's activities in
the United States must be more than "merely preparatory" to a securities
fraud conducted abroad,' and (2) these activities or culpable failures to act
within the United States must have "directly caused" the claimed losses.65
59 JAY TIDMARSH & ROGER H. TRANGSRUD, COMPLEX LITIGATION: PROBLEMS
IN ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE 8 (2002).
o For a complete analysis of varying interpretations of the federal courts'
jurisdiction, see Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court
Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding ofArticle III, 132 U.
PA. L. REV. 741 (1984).
6 Nieman v. Dryclean U.S.A. Franchise Co., 178 F.3d 1126, 1129 (11 th Cir.
1999).
62 Id.
63 The conduct test was announced by the Second Circuit in Leasco Data
Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1336-37 (2d Cir. 1972).
6 Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 987 (2d Cir. 1975).
65 Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475, 478 (2d Cir. 1991).
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The D.C. Circuit has also adopted this view of the conduct test.66 Depend-
ing on what is considered "merely preparatory," this narrow view may be
broadened by courts. Other circuits have adopted a much broader notion of
conduct satisfied when "at least some activity designed to further a
fraudulent scheme occurs within this country., 67 Neither of these tests,
however, provides as broad a basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction as the
effects test.
The effects test gives a federal court subject matter jurisdiction if
activities abroad have substantial effects in the United States. 68 The
Seventh Circuit characterized the effects test as "determin[ing] whether
actions 'occurring in foreign countries have caused foreseeable and
substantial harm to interests in the United States.' ,69 "Interests in the U.S."
commonly refer to U.S. markets and U.S. investors.7" While the conduct
and effects tests were formulated as alternatives, with one applying to
conduct within the U.S. but perpetrating a fraud elsewhere, and another
applying to foreign conduct causing effects in the United States, the Second
Circuit has combined elements of both tests to justify exercising extraterri-
torial jurisdiction, thus substantially broadening the extraterritorial scope
of subject matter jurisdiction over antifraud claims.7' Such an expansion
may cause several problems.
First, there is no clear test for market participants to rely on when
determining how their extraterritorial activities will be evaluated. Securities
issuers, brokers and dealers, and investors should have clear, predictable
guidelines for determining when their activities are within the subject
matter jurisdiction of U.S. courts. When making calculated investment
decisions, these parties incorporate their expectations of what jurisdiction
governs their relationships. Overly broad extraterritorial application of the
antifraud provisions may not fulfill these expectations. Second, extraterrito-
rial application of U.S. law might be viewed as disrespectful of other
66 Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1987). See
Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritoriality of
American Securities Law, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 207, 217 (1996).
67 SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1977). See Choi & Guzman, supra
note 66, at 217.
68 See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206-09 (2d Cir. 1968).
69Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 665 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting
Mak v. Wocom Commodities, Ltd., 112 F.3d 287, 289 (7th Cir. 1997)).
Robinson v. TCI/US W. Comm. Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 905 (5th Cir. 1997).
7, See Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 1995) ("Indeed
an admixture or combination of the two [tests] often gives a better picture of
whether there is ... jurisdiction by an American court.").
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nations' sovereignty. The international community is less aggressive in
enforcing its laws abroad and generally adheres to traditional territorial
boundaries to limit jurisdiction.7 2 There is also a risk of multiple jurisdic-
tions' laws applying to an activity, making compliance difficult and
expensive for companies trying to raise capital by issuing securities.
Finally, courts should not expand their own jurisdiction absent clear
Congressional intent for the antifraud provisions to apply
extraterritorially.
73
To reduce the risk of these problems occurring under the potentially
expansive conduct and effects tests, courts should consider the trans-
substantive notions of the presumption against extraterritoriality, interna-
tional law, and conflict of laws. Each set of principles provides additional
scrutiny and meaningful guidance in order to avoid imprudent exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction in cases where the harm of exercising jurisdic-
tion may outweigh the benefit. Exercising subject matter jurisdiction over
international securities transactions with minimal ties to U.S. markets or
investors adds an additional layer of complexity to an already intricate body
of law by creating problems like those mentioned above. In exercising
extraterritorial jurisdiction over antifraud claims, respect for the trans-
substantive notions of the presumption against extraterritoriality, interna-
tional law, and conflict of laws will limit the application of U.S. law to the
peripheral cases where the benefit for U.S. investors and markets is
minimal and better forums exist for adjudication of the claims.
C. Proposed Trans-substantive Limits on Jurisdiction
1. Presumption against Extraterritoriality
The presumption against extraterritoriality is a canon of construction
which states "that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears,
is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States.74 Courts have generally applied the presumption in three ways.75
72 See Beth Stephens, Translating Filartiga: A Comparative and International
Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations,
27 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 22-25 (2002).
73 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (1994).
7' Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) (deciding a federal
labor law did not apply to a contract for work in a foreign country between the
United States and a private contractor).
71 See Dodge, supra note 3, at 88-89.
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The traditional view of the presumption, applied by Justice Holmes in
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,76 is that U.S. law only applies
to conduct that occurs within the United States." This view reflects the
reasoning and purpose behind the doctrine as originally applied:
"[T]he general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act
as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the
country where the act is done" and this "would lead, in case of doubt, to
a construction of any statute as intended to be confined in its operation
and effect to the territorial limits over which the lawmaker has general and
legitimate power.,
78
The second view, applied by Judge Bork in Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson &
Co.,79 presumes U.S. law applies only to conduct that causes effects within
the United States.8" The third view, applied by Judge Mikva in Environ-
mental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Massey,8 is that U.S. law applies to conduct
within or having an effect within the United States.82 Under each view, the
presumption does not apply when Congress expressly intends for the law
to apply extraterritorially.
The Supreme Court has never ruled on whether the presumption against
extraterritoriality applies to securities law. 83 The Court has applied the
presumption to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 4 the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act,85 the Federal Tort Claims Act,86 and the
76 Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1909).
7 See Dodge, supra note 3, at 88.
78Id. at 85 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Am. Banana, 213 U.S. at 356-57).
9 Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
("Congress was concerned with extraterritorial transactions only if they were part
of a plan to harm American investors or markets.").
80 See Dodge, supra note 3, at 88.
"' Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
82 See Dodge, supra note 3, at 88-89.
83 DAVID P. CURRIE ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 769 (6th ed. 2001).
84 See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499
U.S. 244, 248 (1991). Congress "reversed" the Supreme Court's decision in
Arabian American Oil Co. with section 109 of The Civil Rights Act of 1991 by
making Title VII apply to U.S. companies operating outside of the United States.
Crumley v. Del. State College, 797 F. Supp. 341, 344 n.2 (D. Del. 1992).
85 See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428,
440-41 (1989).
86 See Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 203-04 (1993).
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Immigration and Nationality Act.87 The Court, however, neither applied nor
mentioned the presumption in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California,88
concerning the extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act.89 The presump-
tion's character as a canon of construction may explain some of the
inconsistency in its application. Judges may use the presumption after the
fact as a justification to support the decision they reach, rather than as a
tool to decide the jurisdictional issue. While its application remains
unclear, the presumption against extraterritoriality remains a valid doctrine
that lower courts may consider when deciding issues of subject matter
jurisdiction. The presumption's purpose is to interpret Congressional intent
when none is explicit, and to reflect Congress' position that legislation has
domestic matters in mind unless otherwise stated. For this reason, the
presumption against extraterritoriality should apply as a rebuttable, rather
than an absolute, presumption.
2. International Law
International law is a part of United States law to the extent it does not
conflict with clear Congressional intent,90 and thus may serve to limit the
extraterritorial jurisdiction of the federal courts. "[A]ny extraterritorial
exercise of jurisdiction potentially infringes on the sovereignty of another
state"9' and such exercise must be constrained to avoid international
conflicts. In his treatise on international law, Professor Brownlie suggests
three guiding factors to limit international law conflicts when extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction is exercised:
(i) that there should be a substantial and bona fide connection
between the subject-matter and the source of the jurisdiction;
(ii) that the principle of non-intervention in the domestic or territorial
jurisdiction of other states should be observed;
(iii) that a principle based on elements of accommodation, mutuality,
and proportionality should be applied......
87 See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 173-74 (1993).
" Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993); see Dodge, supra
note 3, at 87.
89 See Dodge, supra note 3, at 87.
90 See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1990).
9' Karen Halverson, Is a Foreign State a "Person "? Does it Matter?: Personal
Jurisdiction, Due Process, and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 34 N.Y.U.
J. INT'L L. &POL. 115, 149 (2001).92 Id. (quoting IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 313
(5th ed. 1998)).
1064 [VOL. 92
EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
Following these conditions provides assurance that the exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction is "reasonable in light of other states' legitimate
interests in the dispute."93
The Brownlie factors are offended by the common exercise of personal
jurisdiction by U.S. courts over (1) foreign defendants with a transitory
presence in the United States and (2) foreign defendants "doing business"
within the United States.94 These notions are not common to the interna-
tional community as bases for personal jurisdiction.95 The international
community generally follows the principle of general jurisdiction: "Plaintiff
follows the defendant to the latter's forum, i.e., to the defendant's
domicile .... ."9 One author cautions against "offending other nations by
perpetuating an already problematic image of American pomposity."97 The
United States must carefully weigh the benefits of exercising personal
jurisdiction over foreign defendants by extraordinary jurisdictional means
against the offense to the international community. This brings the notion
of comity into consideration.
Comity is the courtesy of nations respecting each other's laws.9" The
SEC stated the problem created by U.S. courts' exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction in the securities context: "Principles of comity and the
reasonable expectations of participants in the global markets justify
reliance on laws applicable in jurisdictions outside the United States to
define requirements for transactions effected offshore ... As investors
choose their markets, they choose the laws and regulations applicable in
such markets." 99 Predictability is a crucial consideration when investors
price securities. When U.S. courts expand jurisdiction to apply U.S. law to
transactions logically governed by another nation's law, it changes the
93 Id.
9' See generally Stephens, supra note 72, at 23 (stating that "transitory
presence" and "doing business" are oftentimes tenuous bases for personal
jurisdiction and contrary to the conflict limiting approach supported by the
Brownlie factors).
9' See id. "[J]urisdiction based on 'transitory' presence has been widely
criticized around the world, and has been expressly rejected by the Brussels
Convention, the only international jurisdictional treaty, regulating jurisdiction in
Europe." Id. at 22-23.
96 Id. at 22.
9' Testy, supra note 9, at 958.
98See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
99 Offshore Offers and Sales, Exchange Act Release No. 6863, 1990 WL
311658 (Apr. 24, 1990).
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market participants' assumptions, potentially leading to results not
bargained for by the investors.
For example, a U.S. company incorporates under Nation X law an
offshore subsidiary ("Sub") to undertake a risky oil venture. Sub wants to
raise capital for the venture inexpensively by avoiding U.S. securities law,
which is more stringent than NationX's law. Investors, in turn, will pay less
for the securities than if they were issued under the U.S. securities law
because the investors lack protection. Sub later announces that the venture
is a failure due to volcanic activity near the oil field. Investors are unhappy
with the loss on their investments and they sue Sub in a U.S. court for fraud
under lOb-5 of the '34 Act, alleging the corporation misrepresented the
volcanic risk in marketing the securities. United States jurisdiction is
alleged on the basis of Sub's parent company being a U.S. corporation. If
a court exercises jurisdiction in this case, it will be a windfall to the
investors who knew they did not have the protection of U.S. securities law
and, accordingly, received a discount in the price paid for their securities.
The exercise of jurisdiction will essentially remake the bargain between
Sub and the investors.
Under Professor Brownlie's factors there is no justification for
intervention in this example. There is no substantial connection between
the securities offered by Sub and the parent U.S. corporation, no justifica-
tion to interfere with the jurisdiction of Nation X, and no factors weighing
against accommodation and mutuality. °0 Comity also dictates that, since
no good reason to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction exists, U.S. courts
should respect Nation X's law and territory. U.S. courts will better effect
securities market participants' expectations by considering international
law principles when deciding issues of jurisdiction.
Further support for this reasoned approach to extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion is found in the Restatement Third of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States, sections 402, 403, and 416.101 Section 402 sets forth the
"Bases of Jurisdiction to Prescribe" recognizing the international law bases
of territoriality, nationality, and protective jurisdiction.10 2 The Restatement
'00 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
"'1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OFTHE UNITED STATES
§§ 402, 403, and 416 (1987).
02 ,d. § 402.
§ 402. Bases of Jurisdiction to Prescribe
Subject to § 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to
(1) (a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its
territory;
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drafters in section 403 incorporated a "reasonableness" qualification on the
exercise of jurisdiction under section 402, listing eight factors by which to
evaluate the reasonableness.10 3 This common rule of international law limits
the extraterritorial jurisdiction based on comity, not as a discretionary
principle but a mandatory one.0 4 The Restatement further addresses
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its
territory;
(c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have
substantial effect within its territory;
(2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well
as within its territory; and
(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is
directed against the security of the state or against a limited class of other
state interests.
Id.
'°3Id. § 403.
§ 403. Limitations on Jurisdiction to Prescribe
(1) Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under § 402 is present, a state
may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or
activity having connections with another state when the exercise of such
jurisdiction is unreasonable.
(2) Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable
is determined by evaluating all relevant factors, including, where appropriate:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the
extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has
substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity,
between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the
activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the
regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of
regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate
such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation
is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt
by the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or
economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of
the international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state....
Id.
'Id. cmt. a.
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jurisdiction to regulate securities related activity in section 416.105 The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals has favorably cited the Restatement in
subject matter jurisdiction analysis of 10(b) and IOb-5 cases. 0 6 The SEC,
however, characterized the Restatement position as a substantial departure
I5 Id § 416.
§ 416. Jurisdiction to Regulate Activities Related to Securities
(1) The United States may generally exercise jurisdiction to prescribe with
respect to
(a) (i) any transaction in securities carried out in the United
States to which a national or resident of the United States is
a party, or
(ii) any offer to enter into a securities transaction, made in
the Unites States by or to a national or resident of the
United States;
(b) any transaction in securities
(i) carried out, or intended to be carried out, on an
organized securities market in the United States, or
(ii) carried out, or intended to be carried out, predomi-
nately in the United States, although not on an orga-
nized securities market;
(c) conduct, regardless of where it occurs, significantly related
to the transaction described in Subsection (1)(b), if the conduct
has, or is intended to have, a substantial effect in the United
States;
(d) conduct occurring predominately in the United States that is
related to a transaction in securities, even if the transaction takes
place outside the United States; or
(e) investment advice or solicitation of proxies or of consents
with respect to securities, carried out predominately in the
United States.
(2) Whether the United States may exercise jurisdiction to prescribe with
respect to transactions or conduct other than those addressed in Subsection (1)
depends on whether such exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable in the light of
§ 403, in particular.
Id. Section 416 seems only to illustrate how sections 402 and 403 apply in the
securities context as opposed to altering the substantive requirement for jurisdiction
under the Restatement.
"o See AVC Nederland B.V. v. Atrium Investment P'ship, 740 F.2d 148,
154-55 (2d Cir. 1984) (weighing the reasonableness factors in § 403(2) and §
416(2) in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, Tentative Draft No.2)
and Europe and Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribus London,
147 F. 3d 118, 129 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding exercise of jurisdiction unreasonable
within the meaning of Restatement of Foreign Relations §§ 416(2) and 403).
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from existing law, adding "dangerous vagueness and uncertainty to the
jurisdictional analysis.. ."0' The Restatement approach reflects the same
elements as the conduct and effects tests, but is enhanced by a reason-
ableness component that gives effect to international law principles.
Reasonableness is not a foreign concept to U.S. legislatures, adminis-
trative agencies, and courts and, thus, the Restatement of Foreign
Relations provides a useful tool for U.S. courts in extraterritorial
jurisdiction analysis.1
0 8
3. Conflict of Laws
U.S. courts generally will not apply foreign law in securities cases.'0 9
The court will simply dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion where U.S. securities law is inapplicable."' The explanation for this
is that securities law is viewed as public law "address[ing] interests beyond
those of the litigants," and therefore, "courts feel compelled to apply their
own public law, rather than the public law of a foreign nation."' " However,
for the same reasons that courts may apply foreign law in other areas such
as torts or contracts, courts deciding the application of U.S. securities law
may be informed by conflict of laws principles.
Under conflicts analysis, courts may apply other jurisdictions' laws to
protect reasonable expectations, to maintain uniformity, predictability, and
certainty, to avoid forum shopping, and to recognize comity. 112 The Tenth
Circuit acknowledged these principles in one securities case by stating that
"[w]e cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and international
waters exclusively on our own terms, governed by our laws and resolved
in our courts.""' 3 Where the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction works
against these principles, dismissal maybe more appropriate than expanding
107 Daniel L. Goelzer et al., The Draft Revised Restatement: A Critique From
a Securities Regulation Perspective, 19 INT'L LAW. 431, 431-32 (1985).
"' See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 403 cmt. a (1987).
'09 See Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353 (2d Cir. 1993). See also COx
ET AL., supra note 16, at 1258.
" o See COX ET AL., supra note 16, at 1258.
I.Id. This is generally consistent with the public policy exception to choice of
laws.
112 See CURRIE ET AL., supra note 83, at 769.
113 Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953,957 (10th Cir.
1992).
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jurisdiction. One way courts are recognizing conflict of laws theory is by
enforcing forum selection clauses in international securities agreements."14
The Supreme Court set forth the test for determining the enforceability
of forum selection clauses in international agreements in MIS Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co.'15 Forum selection clauses are "prima facie valid and
should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the resisting party to
be 'unreasonable' under the circumstances."" 6 The Court enforced an
arbitration agreement in a securities case arising out of an international
contract in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.," 7 citing predictability as a
justification:
[U]ncertainty will almost inevitably exist with respect to any contract
touching two or more countries, each with its own substantive laws and
conflict-of-laws rules. A contractual provision specifying in advance the
forum in which disputes shall be litigated and the law applied is,
therefore, an almost indispensable precondition to achievement of the
orderliness and predictability essential to any international business
transaction." 18
The counter argument, stated in dicta by the Supreme Court in
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., "9 is that a forum
selection clause operating as a prospective waiver of statutory rights is
against public policy.120 The focus when deciding whether to enforce forum
selection clauses should be reliability for market participants. In truly
international securities transactions, 2' allowing parties to negotiate the law
"4 See Anthony Ragozino, Domesticating the United States' Securities Laws:
The Ninth Circuit Joins the Majority in Enforcing Forum Selection and Choice of
Law Clauses Displacing U.S. Law in Richards v. Lloyd's of London, 10 PACE
INT'L L. REV. 31(1998).
" M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
"
6 Id. at 10.
"1 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
" 8 Id at 516.
"9 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614
(1985).
120 Id. at 637 n.19 (citing Redel's Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 498 F.2d 95, 98-99
(5th Cir. 1974); Gaines v. Carrollton Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc., 386 F.2d 757,
759 (6th Cir. 1967); Fox Midwest Theatres v. Means, 221 F.2d 173, 180 (8th Cir.
1955)).
12' This description envisions a transaction involving U.S. investors and foreign
securities. The integrity of the U.S. securities markets and traditional jurisdictional
principles may be compromised if companies selling securities on the U.S. public
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that will apply to their bargain and to price their investment accordingly,
creates reliable outcomes for the parties. Recognition of conflict of laws
principles through enforcement of forum selection clauses may be a step
toward U.S. courts abandoning the public policy exception to choice of
laws in some securities cases, and thereby honoring the parties' intentions.
Turning from the theoretical framework for conflict of laws, interna-
tional law, and the presumption against extraterritoriality, it is beneficial to
consider how they may operate to reduce complexity in securities cases by
limiting the extraterritorial jurisdiction of U.S. courts.
III. EXPANSION OF EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
IN THE LOWER COURTS
The federal courts struggle with the complex issue of extraterritorial
jurisdiction in 10(b) and 1Ob-5 securities litigation, resulting in inconsistent
tests for subject matter jurisdiction.'22 The following cases illustrate the
complexity of the jurisdictional issue, the lack of predictability resulting
therefrom, and how applying the trans-substantive principles of conflict of
laws, international law, and the presumption against extraterritoriality can
reduce complexity and promote equity for parties to securities litigation.
A. Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC
23
Itoba, a Channel Islands company, brought suit in the United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut against Lep Group PLC
("Lep"), a London-based holding company registered and traded predomi-
nately on the London Exchange.'24 The suit alleged, among other things,
fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of securities under the 10(b)
and 1Ob-5 antifraud provisions of the '34 Act. 125 Itoba was a wholly owned
subsidiary of ADT Ltd. ("ADT"), a transnational holding company based
in Bermuda but traded on the New York Stock Exchange.2 6 ADT held
markets are governed by the foreign law of their choosing. Unsophisticated
investors may have practically no remedies for fraudulent conduct by the
companies they invest in, resulting in fulfillment of the Supreme Court's prediction
in Mitsubishi Motors. See supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text.
122 See supra notes 60-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the various
tests for subject matter jurisdiction in securities cases.
123 Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 1995).
114 Id. at 120.
"'25Id. at 121.
16 Id. at 120.
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shares of Lep and Lep owned National Guardian, a company ADT was
interested in acquiring. 127 To achieve this acquisition, ADT considered
increasing its ownership of Lep. Another player, Canadian Pacific, was at
the same time considering an investment in Lep and agreed with ADT to
explore a joint purchase of Lep.
128
Both ADT and Canadian Pacific conducted independent analyses of
Lep. Canadian Pacific's report was based on Lep's U.K. annual reports,
shareholder list, and broker reports, as well as the Form 20-F that Lep filed
with the SEC in connection with American Depository Receipts ("ADRs")
traded on the NASDAQ. 129 After assessing Lep, Canadian Pacific opted not
to participate in the joint purchase. ADT continued its assessment,
however, relying on the report generated by Canadian Pacific's investiga-
tion and the Form 20-F filed with the SEC. ADT decided to acquire Lep
and, through ADT's subsidiary Itoba, began purchasing significant numbers
of Lep shares on the London Exchange. After Itoba invested approximately
$114 million in Lep stock, purchasing over thirty-seven million shares, Lep
disclosed a series of business reversals. Lep's stock price consequently
dropped ninety-seven percent and Itoba's holdings lost $111 million. Itoba
alleged Lep did not disclose its high-risk investments and speculative
business ventures in the Form 20-F filed with the SEC and that, if Lep had
done so, Itoba would not have invested. 3'
The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, finding neither the conduct nor the effects test was satisfied. ' 3'
The Second Circuit reversed the lower court using a combined conduct and
effects test.'32 The court specifically found that Lep's filing of the Form 20-
F containing allegedly false and misleading statements (nondisclosures)
was (1) conduct within the United States, and (2) conduct that was not
merely preparatory because it had a negative effect on "thousands of ADT
shareholders in the United States. . . .""' This case is a good example of
127 Id.
8 Id. at 120-21.
129 Id. at 121. Lep deposited approximately ten percent of its 136 million shares
in an American depository which issued one ADR for every five shares of Lep. The
ADRs trade on the NASDAQ ("National Association of Securities Dealers
Automated Quotation") and so Lep was subject to certain reporting and disclosure
requirements of U.S. securities law. Id. at 120. NASDAQ is an over-the-counter
market or residual securities market. Transactions that do not take place on an
exchange such as the NYSE or AMEX are over-the-counter transactions.
'3OId. at 121.
131 Id.
'32 Id. at 124.
133 Id.
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a complex transnational transaction with conduct and effects arguably in
the United States and abroad, leaving a court to decide whether it should
apply U.S. law extraterritorially.
First, it is important to consider why the court chose to exercise
jurisdiction. The Second Circuit characterized the Itoba transaction as
"fraud occurring on an American exchange and persisting abroad that has
impacted detrimentally upon thousands of shareholders in the defrauded
company. .. 134 Strictly applying the conduct test to this scenario, the
filing of the Form 20-F is the only conduct occurring in the United States,
and it was not filed in connection with the securities involved in this
transaction. 35 This filing appears to fit within the definition of "preparatory
conduct" leading up to the fraudulent transaction, which is not enough to
meet the conduct test set out in Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp.
v. Maxwell.136 In Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc. ,'13 however, Judge
Friendly stated, "While merely preparatory activities in the United States
are not enough to trigger application of the securities laws for foreigners
located abroad, they are sufficient when the injury is to Americans so
resident...."138 It thus becomes important that the Itoba court did not view
the injury as only to Itoba, a Channel Islands company, but also found
derivative injury to the U.S. shareholders of ADT. 139 Re-applying the
conduct test in light of this derivative injury, did Lep's filing of the Form
20-F in the United States directly cause ADT's U.S. shareholders financial
losses? The obvious answer is no, since the filing of the Form 20-F was
unrelated to the securities at issue in this transaction.
From Itoba it appears that the conduct and effects tests are flexible
tools for courts seeking to apply the U.S. antifraud provisions
extraterritorially. As previously noted, it is doctrinally problematic that the
court used harm to non-parties to justify jurisdiction over Itoba. This type
of jurisdictional overreaching increases the complexity of securities
litigation. Now consider how the presumption against extraterritoriality,
international law, and conflict of laws might change this decision.
The traditional view of the presumption against extraterritoriality, that
U.S. law only applies to conduct occurring within the United States, would
134 Id.
"'35 Id. at 122.
136 See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
conduct test.
137 Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975).
'3 Id. at 992.
' 9 Itoba, 54 F.3d at 124.
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weigh against a finding of subject matter jurisdiction. 40 The transactions
in Itoba, the stock purchase and filing of the majority of the documents
relied upon by ADT, occurred predominantly in the United Kingdom.
Under Judge Bork's view, which presumes U.S. law applies only to
conduct that causes effects within the United States, 141 the presumption still
weighs against finding jurisdiction in Itoba. 42 In Itoba, the direct effect
was on Itoba rather than a U.S. company, and the effects on the U.S.
shareholders of ADT were too remote to overcome the presumption against
extraterritoriality. Consistent with the analysis above, Judge Mikva's theory
that U.S. law applies to conduct within or having an effect within the
United States 143 supports application of the presumption against extraterri-
toriality in Itoba.'44
International law principles dictate looking at the infringement on
another sovereign that may occur upon exercising jurisdiction.'45 Looking
at Professor Brownlie's factors,'46 there is first an absence of substantiality
between the subject matter and the source of the jurisdiction. The source
of the jurisdiction in Itoba is the filing of the Form 20-F with the SEC.
147
The subject matter is the fraud in connection with the purchase of securities
on the London Exchange.'48 The allegation that these transactions were
made in substantial reliance on the Form 20-F information is arguably not
a bona fide connection, but merely an insubstantial link in an attempt to
procure jurisdiction.
Second, a conglomeration of the conduct and effects tests does not
support application of the principle of nonintervention. The Itoba test, to
the contrary, casts a broad jurisdictional net under which courts can freely
exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction based on tenuous conduct with far-
removed effects. Itoba is an example of a U.S. court using its jurisdiction
to "seek out and destroy fraud (American style) worldwide"' 149 instead of
allowing a jurisdiction with a closer nexus to handle the litigation.
140 See supra notes 74-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of the views
of the presumption against extraterritoriality.
141 Itoba, 54 F.3d at 120-21.
'
42 Id. at 124.
143 See Dodge, supra note 3, at 88-89.
'"Itoba, 54 F.3d at 124.
"41 See supra notes 90-108 and accompanying text for a discussion of
international law principles.
146 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
147 Itoba, 54 F.3d at 122.
14 8 Id. at 120.
149 Testy, supra note 9, at 927.
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Finally, Professor Brownlie's third factor, a reflection of the principle
of comity, does not support the finding of subject matter jurisdiction in
Itoba. The Itoba transaction consisted of foreign companies involved in
purchasing securities of a U.K.-registered company on a London
Exchange. 5 ° Given these facts, Lep would certainly expect to be governed
by the United Kingdom's law. Investors' expectations should be no
different. Recall the SEC statement, "As investors choose their markets,
they choose the laws and regulations applicable in such markets."'' Lep
faced financially devastating effects if convicted of fraud in the United
States and would be forced to remedy Itoba' s losses and, perhaps, the losses
of individual ADT investors. Consider the effect on other foreign Lep
investors who based their investment decisions on Lep's compliance with
U.K. securities laws. Assuming there are similar allegations of U.K.
securities violations based on the business reversals, notions of efficiency
and conservation of judicial resources weigh in favor of forcing Itoba to
sue in the United Kingdom. This would permit all issues to be resolved in
that forum, thus reducing the complexity of the case in U.S. court. Based
on the degree of conduct and effects in the United States, it is unreasonable
to apply U.S. antifraud securities law to this transaction.
The district court's analysis of Itoba on remand provides further
support for denying jurisdiction in U.S. court. 5 ' The court, in its decision
denying a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens, stated, "Other
courts have found that England is an adequate forum for cases brought
under the United States securities laws." 153 As a result, Itoba could maintain
its claims in the United Kingdom.'54
One important aspect of conflicts and international law principles, and
the presumption against extraterritoriality is the trans-substantive effect of
treating similarly situated cases alike. These concepts will limit jurisdiction
only in the fringe cases where the exercise of jurisdiction is overreaching.
SEC v. Berger 55 provides an example where the principles support a
finding of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
150 Itoba, 54 F.3d at 120.
5 ' Offshore Offers and Sales, Exchange Act Release No. 6863, 1990 WL
311658 (Apr. 24, 1990).
152 Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC, 930 F. Supp. 36, 43-45 (D. Conn. 1996).
' Id. at 44. The district court, however, held that the private and public interest
factors of the forum non conveniens analysis did not support dismissal in favor of
the United Kingdom. Id.
154 id.
"' SEC v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2003).
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B. SEC v. Berger
In this case, the SEC brought suit against Michael W. Berger in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging
securities violations, including violations of 10(b) and 10b-5 of the '34
Act.'56 Berger was the sole officer and shareholder of MCM, a Delaware
corporation based in New York, and MCM was the investment advisor to
Manhattan Investment Fund, Ltd. ("the fund"), an offshore investment
company organized under the laws of the British Virgin Islands.'57 The
fund's transactions were brokered in the United States and its assets were
invested in securities traded on U.S. exchanges.'58 The fund itself, however,
was neither traded on an exchange, nor was it subject to U.S. registration
or reporting requirements. Additionally, the fund's investors were almost
exclusively overseas."'
The SEC alleged, and Berger admitted, that in the management of the
fund he lost over $300 million between 1996 and 2000, but failed to report
this to investors. Instead he created false accounting statements to cover up
the losses. Berger sent the fraudulent statements from New York to
Bermuda where they were incorporated into disclosures and sent to
investors abroad. 160 In short, Berger was perpetrating a fraud on foreign
investors from the United States.
While Berger admitted the conduct, he disputed the finding of subject
matter jurisdiction by the district court.' 6' The lower court based its
exercise of jurisdiction on the same conduct test applied in Itoba, finding
(1) Berger's activities in the United States were more than "merely
preparatory" to a securities fraud conducted elsewhere, and (2) the
activities within the United States "directly caused" the claimed losses. 1
62
The Second Circuit upheld the lower court's exercise of jurisdiction,
noting, "'Congress did not mean the United States to be used as a base
for fraudulent securities schemes even when the victims are
116 Id. at 189.
'57 Id. at 188.
158 Id.
' 
9 Id. at 188-89.
'6°Id. at 189.
161 Id. at 190.
162 Id. at 190-91.
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foreigners .... ,163 The presumption against extraterritoriality, interna-
tional law, and conflict of laws supports this application.
Nations commonly recognize the exercise ofjurisdiction over conduct
within their territorial boundaries. The strict traditional view of the
presumption against extraterritoriality 64 supports a finding of subject
matter jurisdiction. Berger's conduct of falsifying the reports occurred in
the United States and was perpetrated through MCM, a U.S. corporation.'65
However, under Judge Bork's view which presumes U.S. law applies only
to conduct that causes effects within the United States,166 the presumption
against extraterritoriality would support preclusion ofjurisdiction because
there were no effects on U.S. markets or investors.167 Finally, the presump-
tion is defeated by Berger's conduct within the United States under Judge
Mikva's theory that U.S. law applies to conduct within, or having an effect
within, the United States. 168 Thus, there is no strong argument for applying
the presumption in Berger.
International law principles reflected by Professor Brownlie's factors,
as well as conflict of laws principles, support jurisdiction. First, there is
substantiality between the subject matter and the source of thejurisdiction.
The source of the jurisdiction is the conduct by Berger creating the
fraudulent statements through his U.S. company, MCM. This same conduct
was the subject matter of the litigation. 169 Second, the SEC action and
subsequent exercise of jurisdiction do not violate the principle of non-
intervention. The fraudulent conduct was within the territorial boundaries
of the United States and involved no foreign markets. 7 ' Similarly, comity
does not support a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Although the fund
163 Id. at 195 (quoting Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 514 F.2d 974, 987 (2d
Cir. 1975)). Cf Mann & Barry, supra note 1, at 863 ("The Second Circuit's
conclusion [in Europe and Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A. (EOC) v. Banque
Paribas London, 147 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 1998)] makes clear that, although the
United States will not permit itself to serve as a base for fraud, neither will it serve
as a jurisdictional haven for all securities transactions.").
'64 Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1909).
165 Berger, 322 F.3d at 188-89.
166 See Dodge, supra note 3, at 88.
167 Conspicuously, in Berger the court stated, "We have no doubt that the
effects of Berger's actions were felt substantially in the United States." Berger, 322
F.3d at 195. The court did not justify this statement or reach the issue because it
found the conduct test was satisfied.
168 See Dodge, supra note 3, at 88-89.
169 Berger, 322 F.3d at 188-90.
"70Id. at 188-89.
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was set up offshore, likely to avoid U.S. tax law, the offshore fund
consisted of investments in U.S. markets and was run by a U.S. company. 7'
It is hard to conceptualize an intrusion on another nation's jurisdiction by
the extraterritorial jurisdiction exercised in Berger. Finally, given these
facts, investors may reasonably expect these transactions to be governed by
U.S. securities laws.1
72
Berger represents an appropriate exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction
supported by the principles of conflicts and international law, as well as the
presumption against extraterritoriality. Another case, Tri-Star Farms, Ltd.
v. Marconi, PLC173 illustrates how the variations in current jurisdictional
tests create different results for similarly situated cases. This result
conflicts with the U.S. system's goal of procedural trans-substantivity
174
and renders the conduct and effects tests unpredictable models.
C. Tri-Star Farms, Ltd. v. Marconi, PLC
Tri-Star was a class action suit brought in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania by purchasers of Marconi
stock and ADRs, alleging violation of 10(b) and lOb-5 of the '34 Act by
Marconi executives. 175 Marconi was a foreign PLC incorporated and doing
business in the United Kingdom, with ordinary shares 176 traded on the
London Exchange and ADRs traded on the NASDAQ.177 U.S. residents
held only 0.15% of the outstanding ordinary shares, but held almost all of
the ADRs. There were two named plaintiffs: Tri-Star, a foreign corporation,
purchased Marconi ordinary shares, and City of Miami Fire Fighters' and
Police Officers' Retirement Trust Fund purchased ADRs.1
78
Marconi provided telecommunications technologies, service, and
equipment for the Internet. The class alleged that while the telecommunica-
tions equipment market was collapsing, evidenced by profit warnings and
reduced earnings estimates from Marconi's competitors, Marconi
announced assurances to investors that its revenues would rise due to a
business structure insulating Marconi from the effects of the market
171 Id.
172 See id.; see also supra note 92 and accompanying text.
173 Tri-Star Farms, Ltd. v. Marconi, PLC, 225 F. Supp. 2d 567 (W.D. Pa. 2002).
17 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
171 Tri-Star, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 569-70.
176 Ordinary shares are the U.K. equivalent to U.S. common stock.
"' Tri-Star, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 570.
178 id.
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collapse. The class further alleged that Marconi's announcements were
fraudulent and made without a reasonable basis. Within two months of
these announcements, Marconi suspended trading of its shares on the
London Exchange and issued a profit warning, forecasting a fifteen percent
drop in sales from the previous year and a fifty percent drop in operating
profit. When trading of Marconi's shares resumed, the price of the ordinary
shares suffered a fifty percent decline.1
79
The class specifically pointed to two Form 6-Ks filed with the SEC
and to articles published in a London Newspaper. The Form 6-Ks
incorporated the press releases made in London. The class alleged that
Marconi's fraudulent conduct caused class members to purchase shares at
an inflated price. Marconi moved to dismiss the claims of Tri-Star and
those foreign class members who purchased shares on the London
Exchange for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Marconi did not,
however, challenge jurisdiction over any purchases of ADRs on the
NASDAQ by foreign or American class members. 8 ' The court found that
jurisdiction did not extend to "Tri-Star or any other non-resident foreign
purchasers of Marconi['s] ordinary shares" based on their inability to meet
the conduct or effect tests.'8'
First, the court found the effects test was not satisfied because the
investors were not American, the purchases were not made on U.S.
exchanges, and the investors did not suffer effects within the United
States. 82 The court's observations about effects jurisdiction are interesting
for another reason. The court correctly noted that it would have jurisdiction
over the claim of a U.S. purchaser of the ordinary shares under the effects
test: foreign conduct affecting a U.S. investor.8 3 The court further warned,
"foreign purchasers of Marconi ordinary shares, however, cannot bootstrap
their losses to these independent American losses to justify jurisdiction
under effects theory."'814 Recall that the Second Circuit in Itoba combined
effects test elements with the conduct test allowing Itoba, a foreign
'
7 9 Id. at 570--71.
180 Id.
"' Id. at 572.
82 Courts should not find the effects test satisfied by a foreign investor acting
in a foreign market but merely feeling the effects of fraud while physically within
the United States. The distinction of physically being in the United States has no
effect on the purely foreign nature of the transaction and should not be read as a
basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction.
'83 Tri-Star, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 573.
194 Id.
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purchaser, to substitute the effects on the American shareholders of Itoba's
parent company ADT, to justify jurisdiction.18' Although one could argue
that Itoba and the American shareholders of ADT were not independent,
Itoba arguably allows the same type of "bootstrapping" warned against by
the Tri-Star court. This illustrates how the seemingly straightforward
effects test can be applied inconsistently and lead to unpredictable results.
Next, the court turned to Marconi's conduct within the United States
in search of a basis for jurisdiction. The court favorably discussed the
Second Circuit's conduct test from Bersch,86 requiring substantial conduct
that is not merely preparatory and a direct causal link between the U.S.-
based conduct and the injury. The court also discussed the Third Circuit's
more lenient standard, which requires only "some activity designed to
further a fraudulent scheme" rather than a direct causal link.'87 The court,
however, found it unnecessary to make this distinction because the U.S.-
based conduct, was "not substantial enough to conferjurisdiction under any
reasonable interpretation .. ..,,18' This is the correct result and should have
been the result in Itoba.
Itoba and Tri-Star are based on essentially identical facts. The conduct
alleged in Itoba was an SEC filing in connection with ADRs traded in the
United States, but the purchases resulting in the harm were of a different
underlying security-ordinary shares traded on the London Exchange.'89
These are essentially the facts of Tri-Star. The primary difference is the
jurisdictional conclusion reached by the courts under the conduct test. The
Itoba court specifically found that Lep's filing of the Form 20-F containing
allegedly false and misleading statements (nondisclosures) was substantial
conduct within the United States, although the bulk of the conduct took
place in the United Kingdom. 9 '
Itoba and Tri-Star illustrate the problem with the conduct and effects
tests. There are no clear limits to their applications. When one court adopts
the test of another court and applies it to essentially the same set of facts,
but reaches an opposite conclusion, the test is ineffective. The conduct or
effects tests should be limited by the presumption against extraterritoriality
and the principles of international law and conflict of laws to ensure that
185 See Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 124 (2d Cir. 1995); see also
supra notes 132-139 and accompanying text.
86 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
.87 Tri-Star, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 573-75.
'8 Id. at 576.
189 Itoba, 54 F.3d at 122; see also supra note 135 and accompanying text.
'90 ltoba, 54 F.3d at 124; see supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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similar securities cases are treated alike and to reduce imprudent expansion
of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
IV. CONCLUSION
Inconsistent application ofjurisdictional tests increases the complexity
of securities litigation and results in unpredictable outcomes for market
participants. Predictability of the standards by which a securities transac-
tion will be judged is essential to allow market participants to make
informed decisions and accurately price their investments based on the
risks involved. Under current extraterritorial jurisdiction jurisprudence,
there is marked uncertainty. The conduct and effects tests are applied
inconsistently by the federal courts, leaving market participants unable to
predict the type and level of conduct and effects required to confer subject
matter jurisdiction on U.S. courts and have U.S. law applied to their
transactions.
It is also important that the established standard limit extraterritorial
application of U.S. securities law to those transactions intended by
Congress. The U.S. antifraud provisions were intended to protect U.S.
investors and U.S. markets. While Congress certainly did not intend the
United States to become a haven for foreign persons perpetrating securities
fraud abroad, any expansion of jurisdiction to transactions not involving
U.S. investors or U.S. markets should be subject to heightened scrutiny. By
considering the trans-substantive presumption against extraterritoriality and
principles of international law and conflict of laws when deciding
extraterritorial application of the U.S. antifraud provisions, courts can limit
unreasonable expansions of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
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